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Abstract 
This paper aims to explore performance of European Union’s export in context of competitiveness targets enclosed in Europe 2020 
strategy. Authors are addressing recent geo-political events regarding EU-Russia political and economic sanctions. Authors 
evaluate only economic results from sanctions and do not make an analysis of the nature of political sanctions. Paper gives an 
overview of the European Union trade performance within last 15 years and makes detailed analysis of the trade structure. Further, 
authors address European Union – Russia trade and nature of the trade. At the end of the article authors evaluate impact of the 
sanctions that took effect within a last year. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Lisbon strategy in year 2000 determined European Union’s (EU) strategic goal of becoming the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010. Lisbon strategy aimed at revitalising innovation, growth and 
labour-market performance across the EU. Poor performance of the Lisbon strategy was widely discussed by many 
(Destefanis & Mastromatteo, 2012; Tausch, 2010), and learnings was brought into development of the new 
Europe2020 strategy (Čolić, 2012; European Commission, 2010; Hervás Soriano & Mulatero, 2010; Theodoropoulou, 
2010) keeping in mind necessity for development of the economies of the member states and regaining 
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competitiveness on the global stage. The Lisbon Strategy did not succeed, as the EU has not become the most 
competitive global region. Many critics claim that Europe2020 will not be successful either. Europe2020 goes beyond 
where its predecessor had by using three adjectives “smart, sustainable and inclusive” as a way of describing the 
quality of growth and the headline goals in the areas of science, eco-efficiency and social matters. But has Europe 
2020 learned the lessons from the Lisbon Strategy, the ten-year programme that was supposed to transform the EU 
into ‘the most competitive and knowledge-based economy in the world’ by 2010? And another big question is about 
big differences in the economic performance of the EU Member states which still leaves a question about challenges 
of the cohesion and regional development in times of post crisis period and new challenges that brings EU – Russia 
political and economic relations. 
 
2. Competitiveness of European Union 
 
The Europe 2020 Strategy was designed as a European exit strategy from the global economic and financial crisis 
that started in 2008, but it risks being somewhat overtaken by events in 2010. Before even having enacted the new 
strategy, the European Union (EU) already faces challenges of a further-reaching nature and different dimension. The 
economic and financial crisis has transformed into a sovereign debt crisis with the risk of contagion to other Eurozone 
members, calling into question not only the solvency of various member states but also many of the achievements that 
had already been taken for granted in the EU. The Europe 2020 Strategy, which received the go-ahead from the Spring 
European Council of 2010, is to reinforce economic policy cooperation with a view to promoting sustainable growth 
in the EU. It succeeds the Lisbon Strategy (2000-2010) and builds on the objectives and toolbox of the revised Lisbon 
Strategy of 2005 (focused on growth and jobs). Like the latter, it is driven by international competitiveness concerns 
and the promotion of productivity, growth and sustainability. It also makes use of the same governance framework 
(Bongardt, 2010; European Commission, 2010). 
 
Authors in this article will take a closer look at the economic performance, international trade in particular, to 
inspect weather the innovation lead to higher added value in trade and increase in competitiveness. European growth 
has been disappointing in the past two decades. Europe failed to catch up with the US in factor productivity, and is 
growing slower than the US economy in and after the financial crisis. While Europe has a balanced external trade and 
relative stable export market shares, this is not the case for many EU Member countries and not for sophisticated 
industries. Competitiveness of the countries can be measured with different methods and criteria. One of the widely 
accepted methodology in comparing competitiveness is carried out by Claus Schwab in Global Competitiveness 
Report (Schwab, 2014). Methodology is based on measuring different areas of countries performance – so called 12 
pillars. Competitiveness has increasingly gained currency across the globe and importance of it is higher than ever. 
The international trade theories explain that different countries have different comparative advantages. Thus, if a 
country is rich in natural resources or capital, it has a comparative advantage over the others (du Granrut, 1991;  
Porter, 1990; Porter, 2007). However, in the current knowledge economy, knowledge as a resource has no natural 
home base, its highly mobile and can be transferred easily anywhere in comparison to natural resources. This has 
made the XXI century more and more competitive (Pillania, 2009).  Competitiveness and country competitiveness 
rankings have increasingly become important and various studies are carried out on the subject. While competitiveness 
of enterprises has been studied by many scholars around the world, competitiveness of nations is a relatively new 
discipline (Garelli, 2006). There are two internationally well recognized and popular annual rankings on the 
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competitiveness of countries, namely Global Competitiveness Rankings and World Competitiveness rankings. The 
concept of competitiveness thus involves static and dynamic components: although the productivity of a country 
clearly determines its ability to sustain a high level of income, it is also one of the central determinants of the returns 
to investment, which is one of the key factors explaining an economy’s growth potential (Schwab, 2014). The 
determinants of competitiveness are many and complex. For competitiveness ranking of the countries, Global 
Competitiveness Report introduces the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI). The GCI captures this open-ended 
dimension by providing a weighted average of many different components, each of which reflects one aspect of the 
complex reality that we call competitiveness. Authors group all these components into 12 pillars of economic 
competitiveness. When we look at the scores and ranking in the report, we will find a methodology which awards 
certain value in every category from 1 to 7. Countries are ranked based on each countries performance and value 
achieved (Fig 1). 
 
Fig 1. Competitiveness Performance of the Selected Countries and European Union, score (1 - 7) (Schwab, 2014, Authors) 
 
In Fig 1 authors has selected to compare EU with seven other countries (USA, Japan, China, South Korea, India, 
Brazil and Russia) which will be used in the further analysis in this paper. Authors are addressing a certain 
competitiveness issues of the European Union. It was already mentioned that EU is a union of 28 countries with 
different performance, than if we take into account average value of the score of the 28 EU countries, results show that 
USA, Japan, South Korea and China has higher score. Of course, if we would take best EU performers (with score 
above 5), than we would take into account performance of 10 countries (EU10): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom (Fig 1). If we take into account results of 
the EU10, than as we can see in the Fig 1, results are much better and closer to USA and Japan. Innovation driven 
economies are determined by Business sophistication and Innovation. While one of the most important measures to 
reflect countries commitment for innovation is expenditures for research and development, Global Competitiveness 
Report is using composite indicator to measure 12th pillar “Innovation”. This composite indicator consists of seven 
sub-criteria: Capacity for innovation, Quality of scientific research institutions, Company spending on R&D, 
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University-industry collaboration in R&D, Government procurement of advanced tech products, Availability of 
scientists and engineers, PCT patents, applications/million population. Innovation as a key factor in the international 
competitiveness authors addressed in one of the previous papers (Priede & Pereira, 2013) where as one of the 
indicators was used total expenditures on research and development as a percent from GDP. World leader in 
expenditures on research and development is South Korea with 4% from GDP. Following South Korea are Japan with 
3,4% and US with less than 3%. European Union is spending around 2% from the GDP. This result is far from the 
Europe2020 strategic target – 3%. But as we already discussed, EU is not homogeneous and some countries are 
performing better than average, for example, larges EU economy – Germany spends 2,84% from the GDP (Priede & 
Pereira, 2013). Since Innovation indicator in the Global Competitiveness Report is measured with different criteria, we 
can look at the results if we take into account more factors (Fig 2). 
 
Fig 2. Performance of Selected Countries in the “Innovation” Pillar, Score (1 - 7) (Schwab, 2014, Authors) 
 
In Fig 2 we can clearly see a difference between our selected countries. Leaders here are USA, Japan, South Korea 
and EU10, followed with great difference by China, Brazil, India and Russia. Many authors stress the importance of 
the innovation in the development of competitiveness and export performance with evidence from different countries 
and product groups (Gatto et al., 2011; Jarreau & Poncet, 2012; Kaimakoudi, Polymeros, & Batzios, 2014; Nachum, 
Jones, & Dunning, 2001; Sandu & Ciocanel, 2014; Silgoner, Steiner, Wörz, & Schitter, 2015; Xiong & Qureshi, 2013; 
Xu, 2010). European Union in the world is searching for the competitiveness and authors in the next section will make 
analysis of the EU’s competitiveness in context of the international trade performance. 
 
3. European Union’s International Trade Performance 
 
Export performance and competitiveness are often regarded as synonymous. Just as a firm’s competitiveness can 
be measured by its participation in the market or by growth of its sales, the competitiveness of a country is often 
identified with the performance of its exports. As part of analysis of the European Union trade performance authors 
started by looking at the shares of national exports in world exports (Fig 3) 
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Fig 3. Share of National Exports in World Exports (%), (Eurostat, Authors) 
 
Fig 3 clearly shows current situation in the international trade and certain trends as well. Worth mentioning is also 
Mexico (2,7% in 2012) and Singapore (2,9% in 2012) but these countries was excluded from the analysis. As we can 
observe, European Union still has the largest share of national exports in the world exports (15,5% in the year 2012). 
But we have to take into account that trend is negative and EU’s share 10 years ago was around 19%. We can observe 
decline in the market share also for other develop countries: USA had 11,1% in year 2012 compared to 15,7% in year 
2002; Japan had 5,7% in year 2012 compared to 9,4% in year 2002. Other countries have a positive trend. One of the 
most rapid growth can be observed in China: 14,7% in year 2012 compared to 7,4% in year 2002. China’s share over 
10 years has almost doubled. This result can be explained by commitment to investment in research and development 
– it was 0,95% from GDP in year 2001 and China managed to increase investment till 1,7% in just 10 years (Priede & 
Pereira, 2013). One of the countries that has lost significant market share during the crisis in years 2008 and 2009 is 
Russia. That could be largely explained by the nature of the Russia’s export which will be discussed later in this paper. 
A good way to demonstrate international trade competitiveness and performance is export / import ratio. International 
trade theories explain all the patterns of trade and it will not be discussed in this paper. Current situation with 
international trade where positive trade balance is observed in Russia (but with very rapid decline since year 2000, 
when it was 3 and 1,7 in year 2013), China has positive trade balance and in year 2013 EU28 also managed to balance 
a trade (positive 54632 million EUR in year 2013). Unites States remain with large negative trade balance (-564963 
million EUR in year 2013). The empirical literature supports the significant relationship between technological 
innovation and trade (Amable & Verspagen, 1995; Amendola, Dosi, & Papagni, 1993; Fagerberg, Srholec, & Knell, 
2007; Laursen & Meliciani, 2000; Meliciani, 2002; Montobbio & Rampa, 2005; Montobbio, 2003). And many 
empirical research studies find evidence in the relation between innovation and trade (Lefebvre, Lefebvre, & 
Bourgault, 1998; Pereira, Bento, & Priede, 2013; Roper & Love, 2002; Wakelin, 1998). In the past two decades, the 
globalization of technology has increased both international trade and innovative activities in some sectors related to 
electronics, physics, and pharmaceutical at a world level (Montobbio & Rampa, 2005). According to the high-
technology (Hatzichronoglou, 1997) trade information from the OECD, we can make certain analysis of the 
technological nature of the trade (Fig 4). 
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Industry labels: Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing (01-03); Mining and quarrying (05-
09); Food, beverages and tobacco (10-12); Textiles and leather products (13-15); Wood and 
paper products (16-18); Coke and refined petroleum (19); Chemicals (20); Pharmaceuticals 
(21); Rubber, plastics and other non-metallic mineral products (22-23); Basic metals (24); 
Computers and electronics (26); Electrical equipment (27); Machinery & equipment (28); 
Motor vehicles (29); Other transport equipment (30); Other manufacturing (31-33) 
Top four industry codes 
1 2 3 4 
RUS 05-09 19 24 20 
BRA 05-09 10-12 01-03 24 
JPN 29 28 26 20 
CHN 26 13-15 27 28 
KOR 26 29 20 30 
IND 19 31-33 13-15 20 
USA 26 20 28 29 
AUT 29 24 16-18 27 
BEL 20 21 29 19 
DNK 10-12 28 21 26 
FIN 16-18 24 28 19 
FRA 20 30 29 10-12 
DEU 29 28 20 26 
LUX 24 22-23 28 10-12 
NLD 26 20 19 10-12 
SWE 29 26 28 16-18 
GBR 29 20 28 05-09 
 
Fig 4. Top 4 Exporting Industries by Selected Countries, as a % of Total Primary and Manufactured Goods, 2011 (OECD, 2013, 2014; Authors) 
 
Classification of manufacturing industries into categories based on R&D intensities according to ISIC rev. 3 
technology intensity definition: High-technology industries: Aircraft and spacecraft; Pharmaceuticals; Office, 
accounting and computing machinery; Radio, TV and communications equipment; Medical, precision and optical 
instruments; Medium-high-technology industries: Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c.; Motor vehicles, trailers 
and semi-trailers; Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals; Railroad equipment and transport equipment, n.e.c.; 
Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.; Medium-low-technology industries: Building and repairing of ships and boats; 
Rubber and plastics products; Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel; Other non-metallic mineral products; 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products; Low-technology industries: Manufacturing, n.e.c.; Recycling; Wood, 
pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing; Food products, beverages and tobacco; Textiles, textile products, 
leather and foot wear. This classification gives us clear understanding of the technological structure of the selected 
countries’ export sophistication.  
 
4. European Union’s Trade Trends in Context of Political and Economic Sanctions 
 
There are several economic risks between Russia and European Union. One of them is associated with trade of 
natural resources and geopolitics (Finon & Locatelli, 2008; Konoplyanik, 2012). Another risk is related to periodical 
market protectionism. During the past decade Russia has imposed import restrictions on different types of food and 
plant products from a vast number of countries, claiming to be acting on food safety scandals as the primary reason. 
However, most observers interpret these measures as acts of protectionism (Elvestad & Nilssen, 2010). Protectionism 
is observed also in other areas: automotive industry, pharmaceuticals (Zarocostas, 2014),  service and investment 
barriers are observed as well (2014 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, 2014). We also have 
to take into account the asymmetric nature of Russia’s counter-sanctions. Fig 5 shows EU28 export trends with main 
trade partners: European non-EU28 countries (like Switzerland and Norway), United States, Russia, China and Japan. 
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Fig 5. Share of Extra EU28 Exports, %. Monthly Data From January 2004 till December 2014 (Eurostat, Authors) 
 
As we can observe in the Fig 5, larges export shares are with European non-EU28 countries (negative trend is 
observed after second part of the year 2013, but it is still above 20%) and United States (with negative trend starting 
from 2004 till mid-2013 and then trend begin to be positive). Strongest export increasing trend can be observed in 
trade with China – doubled within last 10 years. Japanese market is slowly decreasing. And Russian market has large 
fluctuations with very negative trend in the second part of the year 2014. More detailed this can be seen in Fig 6. 
 
Fig 6. Share of the Export to Russia from All Extra EU28 Export (%) (Eurostat, Authors) 
 
As we can see in Fig 6, two negative shocks can be observed in the EU28 export to Russian market. One is related 
to the 2008 economic crisis, that caused decreased market share from 8,74% in September 2008 till 5,16% in January 
2010. After this decline, we could observe lots of fluctuations in the value of export, but still was with positive trend 
and maximum market share reach 8,7% in November 2012. Second decline we can observe after November 2012 with 
dramatic decrease of the export share by the end of the year 2014 (from 8,7% to 4,63%). Results of the year 2014 can 
be explained with counter sanctions from Russia that largely was targeting import restrictions to different product 
groups. On one hand EU28 is facing a challenge from the Russia’s economic policy towards trade restrictions, but on 
the other hand EU28 is exploring alternative export markets. We can observe decrease of export value and market 
share to Russia but at the same time total export value remains steady. This indicates that EU28 is changing export 
market structure in favour to other markets. In Fig 7 we already saw that China is one of the rapidly growing export 
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markets which has increased from 5% in 2004 extra EU28 export share till 10% in year 2014. Positive trends can be 
observed also in export to countries like Turkey, India, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, South Korea and Saudi Arabia 
(Fig 7).  
 
Fig 7. EU28 Export Growth to Selected Countries, 2004M1 = 100 (Eurostat, Authors) 
 
Industry data shows that EU28 is looking for new markets to overcome a challenges caused by Russia’s import 
restrictions. Of course, there are EU Member states and particular industries that are taking large influence from the 
Russia’s policies (like dairy product import ban influence on Baltic Countries and Poland), but overall we can observe 
that long-run policies are targeting risk diversification in export market portfolio to avoid or minimize risks in the 
future. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
European Union still has the largest export share in the world exports but it has a tendency to decline. This calls for 
a certain measures to sustain leading position in the future as well. EU constantly is facing several big challenges in 
order fulfil Lisbon and Euope2020 strategy goals that includes a challenge of that brings large differences in the EU 
Member countries economic performance. EU – Russia economic relations in year 2014 was overwhelmed by political 
and economic asymmetric sanctions. On one hand EU28 is facing a challenge from the Russia’s economic policy 
towards trade restrictions, but on the other hand EU28 is exploring alternative export markets. We can observe a 
decrease of export value and market share to Russia, but at the same time total export value remains steady. This 
indicates that EU28 is changing export market structure in favour to other markets like Turkey, India, Brazil, United 
Arab Emirates, South Korea and Saudi Arabia. 
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